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WAKE UP FANNIE, I THINK I GOT SOMETHING TO SAY TO
YOU: FINANCING COMMUNITY LAND TRUST
HOMEBUYERS WITHOUT STRIPPING AFFORDABILITY
PROVISIONS†
ABSTRACT
Individual homeownership, the backdrop of the American Dream, is often
cited as a panacea of economic and social stability. Investment in and control
over one’s “castle,” the story goes, creates neighborhoods and communities of
involved, committed residents. Besides providing a stable place to live,
homeownership allegedly serves as an important element of wealth
accumulation and its expansion, especially among marginalized populations,
has been a major goal of economic and social policy for decades. However,
the recent foreclosure crisis and related economic collapse exposed
vulnerabilities in the developed system of homeownership and mortgage
financing—vulnerabilities so deep that they have left whole neighborhoods
abandoned, and shaken economic stability across every income bracket. As a
result, some analysts have begun to seriously question the virtues of—and
sometimes to blame—policies that incentivize homeownership for people who
traditionally cannot afford it.
This Comment presents an existing model of affordable homeownership
that has weathered the housing collapse with astounding resilience: the
Community Land Trust (CLT). The CLT model aims to create communitybased, affordable housing available in perpetuity. This Comment outlines the
concepts and structures that underlie CLT affordability, exploring how the
model operates within the context of American homeownership. In particular,
it examines the tensions between the CLT model and the mortgage industry,
focusing on the crucial but often difficult process of obtaining CLT homebuyer
financing. Ultimately, the Comment suggests changes to the Fannie Mae CLT
Uniform Mortgage Rider, an instrument originally developed to encourage
lenders to loan money to CLT homebuyers, but which threatens the fabric of
CLT resilience by stripping the model of its affordability provisions. The
proposed changes suggest that these provisions survive foreclosure, lending
† This Comment received the 2010 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and
Writing.
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stability to the CLT model and acknowledging the demonstrated resilience of
CLT borrowers in the recent housing collapse.
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INTRODUCTION
There are two houses for sale on Pleasant Street in Williamstown,
Vermont. They both have roughly the same square footage.1 Both are painted
white with red shutters, have two-car garages, and sit on grassy, tree-lined
lots.2 One house has a list price of $243,000.3 The other will cost a buyer
anywhere between $110,000 and $185,000, depending on her income and the
number of people in her household.4 In a town where the average family could
afford to pay approximately $160,000 for a home (with an $11,000 down
payment),5 the price difference between the two Pleasant Street properties is
significant. The price, however, is not the only difference. One of the
homes—the less expensive one—rests in the stewardship of the Central
Vermont Community Land Trust (CVCLT), “an affordable housing
organization [based] on the community land trust model.”6 Whoever
purchases this house on Pleasant Street will enter into a unique property
relationship with CVCLT: she will purchase the structure, while CVCLT will
retain title to the grassy, tree-lined lawn, which it will lease to her through a
ninety-nine year, renewable ground lease. The house on Pleasant Street, along
with over 6,000 other homes nationwide,7 rests under the wing of the
Community Land Trust (CLT) model for affordable housing—a model that
removes the cost of land from the price of homeownership, and aims to keep
that price affordable in perpetuity.
CLTs have developed in the United States alongside a growing need for
affordable housing.8 For years, the widening gap between stagnant incomes
and the rising cost of homes excluded increasing numbers of people from the

1 Compare Condominiums, CENT. VT. COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www.cvclt.org/homes_for_
sale.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (on file with author), with Williamstown Vermont Real Estate, BERG,
CARMOLLI & KENT REAL ESTATE, http://www.bckrealestate.com/proddir/prod/12/5771 (last visited May 14,
2010) (on file with author).
2 See sources cited supra note 1.
3 BERG, CARMOLLI & KENT REAL ESTATE, supra note 1.
4 CENT. VT. COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, supra note 1.
5 WILLIAMSTOWN TOWN PLAN DRAFT 36 (2010), available at http://www.williamstownvt.org/Docs/
2010_TownPlan_Sec1-6.pdf.
6 About CVCLT, CENT. VT. COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www.cvclt.org/about_cvclt.html (last
visited Aug. 16, 2010).
7 Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz & Rosalind Greenstein, A National Study of Community Land Trusts 16
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP07YS1, 2007).
8 David M. Abromowitz, An Essay on Community Land Trusts: Toward Permanently Affordable
Housing, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 213, 214 (C.
Geisler & G. Daneker eds., 2000).
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residential real estate market.9 In response to this crisis, federal and state
governments, as well as nonprofit organizations, established programs to assist
low-income people in their struggle for stable shelter.10 These programs often
focus on lowering the monthly cost of housing without affecting the price of
the unit itself as it passes from owner to owner.11 The CLT model assumes a
different approach to affordable homeownership, crafting a strategy aimed at
reducing the cost of the house, not just the monthly payment.12 CLT
homeownership incorporates a “shared equity” element, wherein the
homebuyer agrees that upon reselling her home she will sell it to another lowincome buyer and limit the price she will charge according to a preset formula.
Ultimately, the CLT represents a method of structuring legal property
relationships: “[T]o provide access to land and housing to people who are
otherwise denied access; to increase long-term community control of
neighborhood resources; to empower residents through involvement and
participation in the organization; and to preserve the affordability of housing
permanently.”13
In light of the recent housing crisis, analysts debate the value of
homeownership as a goal for affordable housing programs.14 This Comment
assumes that there is a place for homeownership in the spectrum of affordable
housing and argues that CLTs present a viable model for sustainable, lowincome homeownership. However, because ownership may not be for
everyone, CLTs also incorporate affordable rental units into their portfolios.15
In 2007, 45% of CLTs surveyed offered rental housing.16 Many of these CLTs

9

Julie Farrell Curtin & Lance Bocarsly, CLTs: A Growing Trend in Affordable Home Ownership, 17 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 367, 368 (2008).
10 See RICK JACOBUS & JEFFREY LUBELL, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, PRESERVATION OF AFFORDABLE
HOMEOWNERSHIP: A CONTINUUM OF STRATEGIES 1–2 (2007), http://www.nhc.org/pdf/chp_se_strategies_
0407.pdf (discussing various affordable housing programs, focusing on homeownership and subsidy
retention).
11 Id. at 3.
12 See Tim McKenzie, The Case for Plan B, SHELTERFORCE, Fall 2007, at 36, 37–39, available at
http://www.shelterforce.org/article/637.
13 Overview, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?
fuseaction=Main.SectionHome&sectionID=2 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
14 Joseph Williams, President Shifts Focus to Renting, Not Owning, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2009, at 1.
15 Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 17.
16 Id. at 2.
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use their access to government subsidies and nonprofit, tax-exempt status to
develop inexpensive rental units, sometimes at 30% below local market rates.17
The CLT model has demonstrated exceptional resilience through the recent
rash of nationwide foreclosures,18 and as a 2009 study reveals, efficiently
retains and reuses the value of public subsidies over time.19 Despite the
apparent success of the model, CLT homebuyers have faced difficulty securing
mortgage financing. As a condition of loaning on a CLT property, lenders—
backed by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”)—
require CLTs to agree to amend their model in a manner that threatens the
strength of their long-term affordability. Essentially, these amendments
require that all affordability provisions terminate in the event of foreclosure,
thrusting any and all risk associated with helping low-income individuals
achieve homeownership onto the shoulders of the CLT.
This Comment argues that rather than force CLTs to bear the risk of
homebuyer financing by placing their affordability provisions on the chopping
block, Fannie Mae—a government-sponsored enterprise charged with an
obligation to work affirmatively toward the increase of low-income
homeownership—should revise the language of its Uniform Rider to allow
CLT affordability provisions to survive foreclosure. Part I outlines CLT
basics, describing how the model conceptually and structurally approaches its
primary goal of long-term housing affordability. This Part focuses on the
particularities of place and community in which the CLT grounds its
commitment to affordability, noting that each CLT must negotiate its own way
through a landscape of ethical and social tensions to accomplish its goal.
Following this discussion of conceptual and foundational underpinnings, Part I
outlines how CLTs establish and enforce their commitment to long-term
affordability in their legal and organizational structures.
Having discussed the basics of CLT affordability in Part I, Part II focuses
on the necessary and often difficult process of obtaining financing for a CLT
homebuyer.20 This discussion (1) explores financial risk as an obstacle to CLT
17 Daniel Fireside, Community Land Trust Keeps Prices Affordable—For Now and Forever, YES!
MAGAZINE, Fall 2008, at 28, available at http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/purple-america/community-landtrust-keeps-prices-affordable-for-now-and-forever.
18 See discussion of foreclosure statistics infra notes 263–65 and accompanying text.
19 See discussion of Champlain Housing Trust twenty-year affordability audit infra notes 188–93 and
accompanying text.
20 Although the development goals of the CLT itself, including land acquisition, construction, and
organizational support, must also be financed, those issues are outside the scope of this paper.
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homebuyer financing and (2) analyzes how the allocation of that risk threatens
and thwarts CLT affordability. Focusing on the Fannie Mae CLT Uniform
Rider, this portion of the Comment argues that current solutions to homebuyer
financing, while they may encourage lenders to loan money, gravely threaten
the fabric of CLT affordability by stripping the model of its affordability
provisions. Finally, this Comment argues that in light of its affirmative duty to
further affordable homeownership, and the demonstrated resilience of CLT
borrowers against mortgage default, Fannie Mae should revise its Rider
provisions to ensure that CLT affordability provisions survive foreclosure.
I. THE NATURE OF A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST
A recent nationwide study of existing CLTs revealed that 98% of the 105
CLTs surveyed considered the development of affordable housing a primary
function of their organization.21 This Part explores how the goal of perpetual
affordability has shaped the CLT model, and how the model continues to
incorporate affordability into its structure and operations. Section A examines
the historical development and contemporary status of the CLT commitment to
affordability. Section B discusses the “nuts and bolts” of affordability,
examining where and how the CLT incorporates affordability into its
organizational structures and legal relationships.
A. Commitment to Affordability
The CLT commitment to affordability is found and founded in the lore and
legend of the CLT model—from its international origins, to its first American
manifestation in the civil rights movement, and its current affiliation with
municipal, state, and national housing relief efforts.22 First, this section
examines the importance of land to CLT affordability. Next, it investigates the
many ways that the CLT conceives of and incorporates “community” into its
role as a provider of perpetually affordable housing. Finally, this section
discusses tensions inherent in the CLT model, and outlines ways that CLTs

21 Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 24. The survey included CLTs which provide openspace preservation and land conservation, which may explain the 2 of 105 respondents who did not claim the
provision of affordable housing as a major component of their work. Id.
22 See, e.g., Julia Bartolf Milne, Will Alternative Forms of Common-Interest Communities Succeed with
Municipal Involvement? A Study of Community Land Trusts and Limited Equity Cooperatives, 38 REAL EST.
L.J. 273, 288–92 (2009) (discussing the interaction between CLTs and municipalities, especially the City of
Chicago).
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negotiate their community commitment within the larger political, social, and
economic framework.
1. Long-Term Affordability in the Land
One of the most interesting and effective elements of the CLT’s
commitment to long-term housing affordability lies in the fact that the CLT has
a physical location. The first American CLT emerged in Albany, Georgia,
during the late 1960s.23 Called “New Communities,” the project held the
concept of long-term, stable access to land at its core.24 The New
Communities project—led by Robert Swann, Slater King, and other activists—
grew out of the civil rights movement. The project targeted the capture of over
5,000 acres of land in rural Georgia by an independent nonprofit organization,
which would hold them “in trust” for the perpetual use of rural farmers.25 The
resident farmers would own their houses and other improvements to the land,
but lease the land itself at low cost for a renewable period of ninety-nine
years.26 The New Communities CLT model sought to remedy the disparity in
control of land between classes and racial groups and aimed to offer a stable
source of farmland to primarily African-American farmers, regardless of the
fluctuating market value of land or farm goods.27 The model was designed to
remove land from the speculative market and to protect farmer-residents from
the instability of eviction or foreclosure suffered by poor tenants of more
traditional rental- or mortgage-based models.28
In 1972, Robert Swann and other members of the Institute for Community
Economics (ICE)29 outlined the CLT model in their book, Community Land
Trust: A Guide to a New Model of Land Tenure in America.30 The writers
framed the CLT as a response to land maldistribution based on wealth and
influence.31 The model drew inspiration and guidance from peaceful land
reform movements across the globe, including the Gramdan movement in
23

Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 370–71.
ROBERT S. SWANN ET AL., INT’L INDEPENDENCE INST., THE COMMUNITY LAND TRUST: A GUIDE TO A
NEW MODEL FOR LAND TENURE IN AMERICA, at ix (DRA of Vt. 2007) (1972).
25 Stewart E. Perry, Preface to SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at vii.
26 SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 62.
27 Id. at 3.
28 Id. at 18.
29 At the time, the Institute for Community Economics (ICE) operated under the name International
Independence Institute.
30 JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, NAT’L HOUS. INST., SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING
LANDSCAPE OF RESALE-RESTRICTED OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 21 (2006).
31 SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 1; Perry, supra note 25, at xv.
24
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India, where land was given to villages as trustees with the purpose of granting
land-use rights to individuals.32 The New Communities model also drew from
the structure of the Jewish National Fund in Israel, an effort to bring security of
land to small farmers and their families.33 The Jewish National Fund’s
structure most directly parallels the CLT structure suggested in the guide.34
The centrality of land access to housing availability seems almost too
obvious to state, and yet many approaches to housing policy have not
accounted for this necessity.35 In an article exploring the ethics of housing,
Tim Iglesias argues that American housing policy is informed by a plurality of
five ethical models.36 Iglesias acknowledges that courts and policymakers
often approach housing as an economic good, and that this approach stands in
“profound and persistent” tension with the goal of housing affordability.37
Iglesias also notes that the CLT model of affordable housing conflicts with this
“traditional expectation of housing as economic investment good.”38 He
presents another ethic that approaches housing as “one land use in a functional
system.”39 This ethic, which informs zoning ordinances and planning
commissions, acknowledges the significance of land for housing but does not
ensure that the land will be accessible to low-income individuals.40 The CLT
structure fuses an understanding of housing as a necessary land use with an
understanding that a “functional system” is one in which low-income
individuals can access the allocated land.
As demonstrated by the New Communities initiative, land hosts the
community that can claim it, and the act of claiming land and determining its
use stands at the core of CLT long-term affordability. For example, in the
32

DAVIS, supra note 30, at 20.
SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 9−10.
34 Id. at 16–17.
35 Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 511, 511 (2007).
36 Id. These models include “(1) housing as an economic good, (2) housing as home, (3) housing as a
human right, (4) housing as providing social order, and (5) housing as one land use in a functional system.”
Id.
37 Id. at 530.
38 Id. at 527.
39 Id. at 569–76. Iglesias argues that this ethic is the most promising approach for the future of
affordable housing because it leaves room for the mandatory inclusion of affordable housing without phrasing
it in terms of redistribution. Examples of this approach include movements for “workforce housing,” which
argue for proximity of housing to employment for all income levels in a district. The CLT model is
compatible with this approach to housing policy and can be an effective way of preserving space for the
purpose of “workforce housing.” Id. at 592–93.
40 Id. at 585.
33
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mid-1980s residents of Boston’s Roxbury neighborhood found themselves
victims of widespread urban divestment.41 Under the motto “Take a Stand on
the Land,” community members launched a campaign to revitalize their
neighborhood called the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI). After
extensive grassroots planning, the community implemented a plan to redevelop
the neighborhood.42 Community members, backed by the financial assistance
from the City of Boston and foundational grants, spent thousands of volunteer
hours cleaning up the neighborhood.43
As the reality of urban recovery came into focus, DSNI planners realized
that without somehow ensuring the land’s future affordability, the very
community members who invested so heavily in the neighborhood
revitalization could be priced out of the neighborhood by gentrification.44 It
occurred to these leaders that the neighborhood’s increasing value would not
be created by the market but rather by the community’s own efforts. If the
land were merely resold to individuals, that increased value would be allocated
to the private pockets of people who may or may not have contributed to the
revitalization effort.45 If, however, the land could somehow remain in
community control, then the increased value could be preserved for community
members, present and future, many of whom would not otherwise have the
resources to access the value they helped create. DSNI chose to allocate the
value of the revitalized neighborhood to the community itself and formed
Dudley Neighbors Incorporated, a CLT.46
2. Long-Term Affordability in the Community
As demonstrated by DSNI’s use of the CLT model to channel the benefits
of neighborhood redevelopment back into the community, the CLT
commitment to long-term affordability arises out of a commitment to
community. In addition to their primary function of fostering long-term
affordable housing, many CLTs engage in other community-based activities,
including homebuyer counseling, community gardening, and political

41

Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 222.
The City of Boston granted the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative the power of eminent domain so
that it could acquire vacant properties that impeded the development process. Id.
43 See PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD 72–73 (1994).
44 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 223.
45 Id.
46 Id.
42
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advocacy.47 By offering stable, affordable housing options48 from within a
community, CLTs become a center of gravity for other activities, weaving
long-term affordable housing into the fabric of community development.
The CLT is a “trust,” with beneficiaries who must sit at the center of
organizational and management decisions.
The trustee–beneficiary
relationship is at the heart of the CLT community concept and its method of
providing long-term affordability. The traditional CLT ownership model, in
which ownership of the land and structure is divided between CLT and
homeowner, lowers the cost of homeownership for each individual buyer.49
This aspect of CLT affordability is similar to that of condominium
associations,50 where the cost of common areas, amenities, and maintenance is
shared among all owners, rendering the cost of housing lower than it would
otherwise be if each owner separately owned equivalent property. The CLT
model, however, incorporates a broader understanding of shared ownership.
The CLT board operates as a trustee and is formed with the express duty of
preserving the affordability of its units for future homebuyers.51 The Uniform
Condominium Act articulates this difference in its definition of person:
“‘Person’ means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision
or agency, or other legal or commercial entity. [In the case of a land trust,
however, ‘person’ means the beneficiary of the trust rather than the trust or
the trustee.]”52
This definition illuminates a difference between control and trusteeship.53
Although both the CLT and the Condominium Association serve as organized
entities that govern residential property relationships, in the CLT the role of

47

Id.
For most CLTs, long-term affordable housing goals are realized through the classic CLT
homeownership model. However, other CLTs also host low-income rental options. See, e.g., Sungu-Eryilmaz
& Greenstein, supra note 7, at 2 (45% of responding CLTs reported to host rental units on their property).
49 Merely removing the value of the land from the cost of the structure does not ensure long-term
affordability; however, it is an element of the CLT model that enables long-term affordability to be established
in the ground lease. See infra notes 124–78 and accompanying text.
50 Some CLTs also incorporate condominium units into their portfolio of homes. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS,
BURLINGTON ASSOCS. IN CMTY. DEV., STARTING A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST: ORGANIZATIONAL AND
OPERATIONAL CHOICES 61 (2007), available at http://www.richmondhabitatclt.yolasite.com/resources/
Starting_a_CLT_Book_Format_Beneficiaries_Addition_0407.pdf.
51 Id. at 25–28.
52 UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(19) (1980) (emphasis added) (brackets in original).
53 See discussion of New Communities supra notes 25–34 and accompanying text.
48
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trusteeship54 demands that the extent and substance of resident control remain
in service of the larger circle of trust beneficiaries: the greater community—
present and future.55
In addition to extending into the future, the CLT community reaches well
outside of its formal property lines. When forming a CLT, organizers work to
incorporate fully the broader community into the goal of providing long-term
housing.56 CLTs envision homeownership as an investment in stable access to
shelter and thus community security.57 The model connects a web of
stakeholders including CLT resident homeowners, other CLT residents (if
any), all possible future CLT residents, the surrounding residential and
business community, and the public at large.58 It is in consideration of this
network of interests that the CLT holds its land for the purpose of providing
low-income housing.59 In this way, the CLT model intertwines its members’
ownership interest with those of the surrounding community.
3. Tensions in Long-Term Affordability
A CLT’s commitment to ensuring long-term affordable housing, though
firmly grounded in the land and community, floats amidst a series of tensions.
First, the CLT faces a tension between the conventional concept of ownership
as individual control over property and the concept of community trusteeship.60
This tension arose even in the formation of New Communities, when its
founders struggled to balance “the right of the individual user of land to control

54 In recent years, CLT advocates have used the term stewardship to express the role of the CLT in
respect to preservation of affordable housing. This Comment uses the term trusteeship here to set up the
tension between trusteeship and control as discussed in New Model of Land Tenure for America. See infra note
60. The CLT movement’s use of the term trusteeship probably originated from the Gramdan movement in
India. See History, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?
fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=30 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). The reasoning behind the shift in
terminology is unclear, but it appears as though it may be an attempt by CLT advocates to avoid invoking the
legal connotations of the word trusteeship in situations where those duties would complicate CLT formation.
55 See John Emmeus Davis, Homes That Last, SHELTERFORCE, Winter 2008, at 18, 23, available at
http://www.shelterforce.org/article/1237/homes_that_last.
56 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 50, at 38–43.
57 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.
58 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 25.
59 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 18.
60 See SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 26. In the guide, the authors propose a binary model of property
management where control referred to the ability of the land’s occupants to control the everyday operations
while trusteeship described the separate duty of a group of people—some of whom may also live on the land
trust—to ensure that the long-term goals of land access and affordability be implemented and maintained. Id.
at 26–30.
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his life; and the need for a body . . . that can perform the long-range allocation
function and ensure . . . the goals of the trust.”61 The founders of New
Communities imagined that their target community would look upon
trusteeship with skepticism:
People who have never had a chance to own land . . . may very well
reject the idea of a trusteeship over the land they expect to use.
Members of minority groups who have been typically excluded from
land ownership and often view it as the only way to gain control of
both land and their own destinies, may see such a trusteeship as
62
merely another exclusion.

Though perhaps smacking of paternalism, the New Communities concept of
trusteeship promised the benefit of secured land tenure.63 However, unchecked
by some aspect of resident control, trusteeship does little to ensure that a
community will be able to tailor the terms of affordable, accessible land tenure
to local needs as they arise.
The principal question of resident control hinges on whether and to what
extent the organizers of the CLT believe that CLT residents will be able to
represent adequately the interests of future low-income residents as they make
day-to-day decisions that could affect the affordability of CLT housing. After
years of evolution, the CLT model still grapples with the balance between
resident control and stewardship.64 This tension challenges entrenched
concepts of homeownership and property and stands at the heart of most policy
debates over the CLT model.65
Imbedded in the long-term goals of the CLT structure is a dialectic of
value.66 CLTs understand homeownership as a means of secure land tenure, as
opposed to a speculative investment opportunity.67 However, the relationship
between the two is more complex than this dichotomy suggests. A CLT’s goal
of maintaining durable affordability68 pulls against the needs of a low-income

61

Id.
Id.
63 Id.
64 See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 71–72.
65 See Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 234.
66 See Iglesias, supra note 35, at 527–28 (discussing the conflict between the CLT model and an ethic of
housing as an economic good).
67 See Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.
68 Durable affordability is a term used to describe the set of policies that restrain the price of a CLT unit
from buyer to buyer. See RICK JACOBUS & RYAN SHERRIFF, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, BALANCING DURABLE
62
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resident who, in order to relocate in a rising market, would need to realize
some degree of return in her investment.69 These two goals are not mutually
exclusive, and both inform the establishment of CLT resale restrictions.70 The
CLT’s precise organizational structure will determine the process by which
resale restrictions are calculated and can be amended.71 However, CLTs
involve their membership (comprised of homeowners) in the amendment of
resale restrictions.72 This ensures that homeowner concerns are considered in
the formation of policies that govern investment return. Therefore, the manner
in which the CLT balances resident control and CLT stewardship73 will
influence how the CLT balances durable affordability against an opportunity
for wealth accumulation.
Another tension that CLTs face arises when they choose which sector of
the population they will aim to serve.74 For example, the Madison Area
Community Land Trust describes itself as “a (501c) non profit organization
seeking to promote affordable housing for first time home buyers at or below
80% of Median income in the Madison and Dane County area.”75 This
decision addresses the geographic and financial scope of the population for
whom it would like to offer affordable housing.76 Geographically, a CLT must
devise a service area such that it is both manageable and effective.77
Financially, the CLT should target a population that is not only in need, but
also to which it is financially possible to offer homeownership.78 Because the
typical CLT model affords some level of voting rights to members,79 the

AFFORDABILITY AND WEALTH CREATION: RESPONDING TO CONCERNS ABOUT SHARED EQUITY
HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 (2009).
69 Id. at 10. It is important to note that there are many reasons (beyond the need to relocate) why an
element of wealth accumulation is not incompatible with the CLT model. See id. at 11–13.
70 See discussion of resale formula infra notes 164–75 and accompanying text.
71 Resale restrictions are generally chosen by CLT organizers, but their amendment is provided for in the
bylaws.
72 See discussion of resale formula amendment infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
73 I have transitioned to using stewardship in place of trusteeship to reflect contemporary terminology.
For a discussion of the relationship between the two words, see supra notes 54, 60.
74 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 25–28.
75 About the Madison Area CLT, MADISON AREA COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www.
affordablehome.org/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
76 CLTs might also determine eligibility for housing based on characteristics such as age, disability, and
demonstrated need. DAVIS, supra note 50, at 28.
77 Id. at 32–34.
78 Id. at 25–27.
79 Membership may include not only CLT residents, but also persons in the service area who choose to
affiliate themselves with the CLT. Id. at 70.
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characteristics of its service population can have a direct effect on the
operation of the CLT.80
When navigating any of these tensions, a CLT must take into account the
social, political, and economic climate within which it will operate. In this
way the CLT is often in tension with existing policies and institutions.
Sometimes what seems like the best choice for the community conflicts with
the qualifications for broader funding sources or greater political support.81
The weight of these tensions varies within communities, and their resolution
sculpts CLTs into fundamentally local creatures. Any description of CLTs
should acknowledge that the CLT model resembles a constellation of
commitments and tendencies rather than a determined set of common, concrete
features.82 This flexibility, while it allows a CLT to cater its policies to a
community’s needs, complicates efforts to advocate for broad CLT-friendly
policy because the legislative and regulative process generally requires great
specificity.83
B. The CLT Establishes Its Commitment to Affordability in Its Formal
Structure
When a CLT transforms from an idea born out of local need into a
recognized organization, it establishes its commitment to long-term affordable
housing in the rules and legal structures that define and regulate its operation.
Through this process, each CLT negotiates the tensions that surround it,
devising solutions that both respond to the particularities of its establishment
and further the goal of long-term affordability. The following discussion
attempts to navigate the landscape of CLT tendencies without sacrificing the
complexity and diversity that underlie the model. This section discusses ways
that CLTs have implemented and could implement goals of long-term housing
affordability through the intentional use of organizational structure, legal
relationships, and governing documents.

80

Id. at 25.
Id. at 28.
82 Id. at 1.
83 For example, in order for the Community Development Act of 1992 to make CLTs per se Community
Development Housing Organizations (CDHOs), CLTs had to be defined. The definition outlines certain
characteristics of a CLT that may not apply in some scenarios, such as governing board composition. 42
U.S.C. § 12773(f) (2006).
81
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1. Long-Term Affordability Established in CLT Organizational Structure
A classic CLT84 is set up as an independent, nonprofit corporation under
the laws of the state in which it is formed.85 As an entity that provides
affordable housing and other community services, CLTs typically apply for
federal 501(c)(3)86 nonprofit, tax-exempt status early in their formation.87
Nonprofit status qualifies CLTs for many forms of financial assistance beyond
the benefit of tax exemption.88
Because a CLT will need to attach copies of its articles of incorporation
and bylaws to its application for 501(c)(3) status, CLT organizers need to
prepare these documents early in the formalization process.89 Articles and
bylaws outline, among other things, the requirements of CLT membership and
the method for establishing a governing board.90 In the classic CLT model,
members have considerable impact on the organization because they vote for
and can serve on the CLT board.91 Thus, at an early point in formation, CLT
organizers must address the tension between community control and the
stewardship goals of the organization by specifying the parameters and powers
of membership.
The National CLT Network (NCLTN)92 lists “representative governance”
as one of its core principles, defining it as the integration of “key stakeholders

84

I borrow the term classic from John Davis, a prominent and prolific CLT advocate, to discuss the most
common forms of CLT legal and organizational structure. DAVIS, supra note 50, at 1 (“Although there is
much variation among the 200 CLTs already in existence or under development in the United States, there
are . . . key features that are found in most of them. These features . . . defin[e] and distinguish[] what may be
called the ‘classic’ CLT . . . .”).
85 Id. at 1–2. Generally, in cases where a CLT is not an independent nonprofit, it exists as a project of
another nonprofit organization. Id.
86 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
87 For details on this process and general tips for CLTs as they fill out the 501(c)(3) application, see ICE,
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST LEGAL MANUAL § 6, at 1 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter ICE (Third)], available at
http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=1614.
88 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 51 (“Any federal funds that are offered to nonprofit 501(c)(3) corporations for
the construction of affordable housing . . . can be used—and have been used—by CLTs.”).
89 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 6, at 14.
90 Id. § 4, at 1.
91 ICE, COMMUNITY LAND TRUST LEGAL MANUAL § 5C, at 1–3 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter ICE
(Second)], available at http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=1613.
92 The National Community Land Trust Network (NCLTN) formed in 2006 out of the Institute for
Community Economics (itself a descendent of Robert Swann’s International Independence Institute). NCLTN
provides research and resources on the CLT model. Who We Are, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST
NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Main.SectionHome&sectionID=1 (last visited
Aug. 16, 2010).
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in the decision-making of the organization, particularly residents on
community owned land.”93 The classic CLT model extends membership to
persons residing anywhere within the CLT service area.94 For example, model
language provided by ICE for classic CLT articles of incorporation outlines
membership as:
(a) The Initial Members . . . shall be those persons who have attended
at least one “organizing meeting” . . . .
(b) The Regular Members . . . shall be (1) the “Lessee Members,”
who are all persons who lease land or housing from the Corporation
or who lease or own housing located on land leased by another entity
from the Corporation, and (2) the “Non-Lessee Members,” who are
all other persons who qualify as Regular Members under the
95
Bylaws.

Corresponding language from the ICE Model Bylaws further defines these
categories:
a. The Lessee Members . . . shall be all persons who lease land or
housing from the Corporation or who lease or own housing that is
located on land leased by another entity from the Corporation.
b. The General Members . . . shall be all other persons, eighteen
years of age or older, who have complied with the following
requirements.
(1) Submission of a Membership application . . . .
96
(2) Payment of dues as established by the Membership . . . .

This language, although perhaps imprecise,97 demonstrates the scope of membership
of a classic CLT.
93

Id.
ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 5A, at 1.
95 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 4, at 10. This language leaves ambiguity as to how many and which
members of a lessee household count as Lessee Members. More precise language appears in the bylaws of the
Champlain Housing Trust (CHT):
94

Resident Members shall include all members of any household living in property owned, in
whole or in part or otherwise in stewardship with the Corporation, as described in Article V, who
are aged 16 years or older. This shall include single-family home-owners who lease land owned
by the Corporation, owners of housing units who have granted BCLT or the Corporation a
Housing Subsidy Covenant, tenants in rental units owned by the Corporation or by a limited
partnership in which the Corporation, or any subsidiary of the Corporation has an ownership
interest, and members of limited-equity housing cooperatives that have signed a Contract for
Services with the Corporation or BCLT.
Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. II, § 2 (2009) (on file with Champlain Housing Trust and author).
96 ICE (Third), § 5A, at 3.
97 See supra note 95.
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Once CLT organizers establish a membership body, they write the bylaws
to outline general operations.98 The bylaws govern the powers and duties of
members; the composition, selection, and operation of the board of directors;
and the establishment and amendment of fundamental pillars of the classic
CLT, such as resale-restriction formulas and ground leases.99 The bylaws also
outline a process for amendment, the back door through which great changes
can occur.
CLT bylaws serve as a procedural buffer to protect the stewardship goals of
the CLT. For example, ICE recommends that CLTs require a minimum of
two-thirds vote by directors and members for an amendment to pass.100 The
Champlain Housing Trust (CHT) Bylaws require a two-thirds vote by the
board of directors, quorum established, and a three-fourths approval by the
general membership.101 CHT also requires a procedure of notification before
amendments can be presented to the membership.102
In addition to general bylaw amendments, the process for amending the
resale formula tends to include heightened procedural requirements.103 CHT
requires a separate procedure for the amendment of resale-restriction
formulas.104 First, any discussion pertaining to the amendment of the formula
by the board of directors must be noted in advance with ten days notice to each
director.105 Second, a motion to amend the formula can only be made after
two-thirds of the board (quorum required) find that the current formula “may
be detrimental to the mutually-held purposes of the Corporation, Its Members,
lessees, and Covenantors.”106 Third, the board may propose and vote on a new
formula, which must pass by two-thirds vote.107 Finally, once adopted by the
board, the new formula must be presented to a special meeting of the general

98

See, e.g., Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. III–V.
ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 5A, at 1–2.
100 Id. at 15–16.
101 Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. VII.
102 Id. (“[P]rovided that written notice setting forth the nature of the proposed change(s) shall have been
given to all Members no later than two weeks prior to the meeting. The notice must state that the purpose, or
one of the purposes, of the meeting is to consider the proposed amendment and contain or be accompanied by
a copy or summary of the amendment.”).
103 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 12, at 1.
104 These formulas are referred to as “limited appreciation formulas” in the CHT Bylaws. Champlain
Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. IX.
105 Id. art. IX § 2(a).
106 Id. § 2(b).
107 Id. § 2(c).
99
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membership, and two-thirds of the members present (quorum required) must
approve the formula for it to take effect.108
Bylaw provisions like Article IX of the CHT Bylaws, which provides for
the amendment of a resale formula, demonstrate the power that the board of
directors can wield over the CLT’s affordability goals, and the detail of
provision required to resist that possibility. The board’s potential power
pressures CLT organizers to carefully construct provisions outlining the
composition and election of the board of directors.109 Although CLTs vary
widely based on local need, the classic CLT model suggests a tripartite
composition for the board of directors consisting of (1) Resident Members, or
persons who occupy CLT housing;110 (2) General Members, or CLT members
residing within the service area but not in CLT housing; and (3) “Public
Representatives” nominated by the serving board of directors and intended to
represent the public interest that may not already be represented by the General
Member representatives.111 The composition of the board is intended to ensure
representation of a wide variety of stakeholders in the CLT mission and to
prevent a circumstance where a single “kind” of stakeholder dominates the
decision-making process.112
The U.S. Congress codified the classic CLT board of directors structure in
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 when it gave
complying CLTs per se status as Community Housing Development
Organizations (CHDOs).113 CHDO status renders CLTs eligible for federal
Home Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) block grant funding, at least
108

Once passed, the new formula does not affect existing leases or agreements based on the old formula.

Id.
109

ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 5B, at 3–5.
Some CLTs that offer different varieties of residence, such as single-family residence, rental, or
limited equity cooperative housing, allocate board seats in this section among the various types of CLT
occupants. Id. § 5B, at 4; see also, e.g., Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. III § 3.
111 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 5C, at 4.
112 Id.
113 42 U.S.C. § 12773(f) (2006). The statute sets out a definition of “community land trust”:
110

For purposes of this section, the term “community land trust” means a community housing
development organization . . . .
(5) whose board of directors—
(A) includes a majority of members who are elected by the corporate membership; and
(B) is composed of equal numbers of (i) lessees pursuant to paragraph (3)(B), (ii) corporate
members who are not lessees, and (iii) any other category of persons described in the bylaws
of the organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
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15% of which must be given to CHDO organizations.114 The codification of
the classic CLT board structure exemplifies a tension between local control
and broader state regulation: now, if a CLT develops a different board structure
that works better in its local context, the CLT sacrifices per se eligibility for
CHDO status.
CLTs use their operating documents to establish a structure within which
they can anticipate and address adverse interests and tensions to ensure longterm access to affordable housing. These documents also state the CLT’s
organizational purpose, which—although often tailored in anticipation of taxexempt status and funding eligibility115—records the mission of the CLT for
posterity—arguably, its most important beneficiary.
2. Structure of Legal Relationships
In addition to its organizational structure, a CLT establishes its
commitment to long-term affordable housing through the legal relationships it
forms. These relationships arise out of a series of documents and embody the
classic CLT approaches to land, homeownership, property value, and
community development.
a. Split-Ownership as a Basic Method of Affordability
The most basic element of the classic CLT model involves the splitting of
ownership between the CLT and the homebuyer: the CLT holds title to land
and sells structures located on the land.116 In the classic CLT model, the
structure is a single-family home purchased by an income-qualified
individual.117 However, CLTs apply the split-ownership model to multifamily
residences, office buildings, and other scenarios where the party purchasing the
structures is not an individual homebuyer.118 This ownership model appears in
Congress’s definition of a CLT as described in the Housing and Community

114

24 C.F.R. § 92.300(a)(1) (2009).
See ICE (Third), supra note 87, §§ 3, 4, 6.
116 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.
117 Id. at 214–15.
118 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 2. Unless otherwise specified, the reader may assume that this Comment
treats CLT structures as units of housing.
115
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Development Act of 1992.119 Thus, to qualify for the benefits of per se CHDO
status, a CLT must offer this type of ownership structure.120
The split-ownership structure relies on the transfer of a leasehold interest in
the land from the CLT to the purchaser. The parameters of the purchaser’s
leasehold interest are governed by a ground lease.121 By splitting the
ownership of the land and making the purchaser’s rights contingent on a
ground lease, the CLT model sets up two important aspects of long-term
affordability: (1) price reduction,122 and (2) the power to recapture the unit
after the purchaser moves on.123 Combined, these two factors work to
subsidize the cost of housing124 and maintain the possibility that the unit will
perpetually serve the broader goal of long-term housing affordability.
b. Ground Lease as an Instrument of Affordability
The split-ownership model requires a document for governing the
relationship between CLT as landowner and the purchaser as owner of the
improvements.125 The CLT model uses a ground lease to define this
relationship.126 Ground leases have been used for centuries in agricultural and
commercial real estate transactions.127 CLT ground leases generally operate
for a term of ninety-nine years and provide an option to renew.128
The ground lease plays a central role in the functioning and long-term
affordability of CLT housing.129 NCLTN circulates the ICE Model Ground
Lease, drafted in 2002, as “a central document in the CLT movement.”130
119

42 U.S.C. § 12773(f) (2006).
This does not mean that CLTs cannot diversify their methods of housing stewardship by, for example,
holding rights of repurchase in otherwise price-restricted units. DAVIS, supra note 50, at 2.
121 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. The ground lease will be described in more detail in Part I.B.2.b.
122 Rosalind Greenstein & Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz, Community Land Trusts: Leasing Land for Affordable
Housing, LAND LINES: NEWSLETTER OF THE LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, April 2005, at 8, available at
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1008_landlines final 4.05.pdf.
123 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.
124 The cost of housing is subsidized by removing the accruing value of the land from the equation.
Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, supra note 122, at 9.
125 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.
126 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 18.
127 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.
128 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 2.
129 Id.
130 CLT Toolkit, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.
php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=111 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). The Model Ground Lease is in a
process of revision currently and is slated for release sometime in 2010, subject to approval by Fannie Mae.
Id.
120
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Many CLTs use this document as a template for their own ground lease,
sometimes copying it to the word.131 Furthermore, Fannie Mae requires that
CLT leases conform to the ICE Model Ground Lease to qualify for its
mortgage products.132 For this reason, the bulk of this discussion draws from
the ICE Model Ground Lease.133
Like the bylaws, the ground lease establishes a lessee’s status as a regular
voting member in the CLT.134 In providing that lessees are always voting
members, the ground lease recognizes and protects a lessee’s interest in the
operation of the CLT.135 While the bylaws can be amended by a sufficient
vote of the membership,136 the material terms of the ground lease have the
potential to operate for nearly 200 years.137 If a bylaw amendment were to
conflict with terms in the ground lease, those terms would not apply unless the
lessee specifically consented to their incorporation.138
Through ground lease provisions, the classic CLT model establishes and
enforces its most robust tactics to preserve affordability, including: resale
restrictions;139 affordability limitations upon transfer;140 CLT options to
repurchase;141 and limitations on use,142 assignment, and sublease.143 The
ground lease also includes provisions to protect the lessee as a low-income
homebuyer, such as granting the CLT the right to refuse the terms of a lessee’s
mortgage.144

131 See, e.g., CMTY. HOUS. TRUST OF SARASOTA, GROUND LEASE (2005), http://www.
burlingtonassociates.net/resources/archives/CHT%20Ground%20Lease.pdf.
132 FANNIE MAE, FORM 2100: COMMUNITY LAND TRUST GROUND LEASE RIDER (2006), available at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/forms/2100.jsp; see also discussion of Fannie Mae’s role in CLT
homebuyer financing infra Part II.C.
133 The Model Ground Lease is set forth in section 12 of Community Land Trust Legal Manual. See ICE
(Second), supra note 91, § 12.
134 Id. § 12, at 16.
135 Of course, this does not prevent a majority of members from amending the bylaws to limit
membership control, but it does guarantee that lessees will have the right to vote on such a decision.
136 See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
137 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 2.
138 Id. § 12, at 3.
139 Id. § 12, at 13.
140 Id. § 12, at 11.
141 Id. § 12, at 12.
142 Id. § 12, at 3.
143 Id. § 12, at 14.
144 Id. § 12, at 7. The implications of the ground lease on mortgage options and vice versa is discussed in
further detail in Part II.
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Some of the ground lease terms are common aspects of a lessee–lessor
relationship, which the CLT applies in service to its greater affordability goals.
For example, as tenants under the ground lease, homebuyers must comply with
a ground lease provision that limits the property’s use as a primary
residence.145 The Model Ground Lease requires resident occupancy for a
certain number of months, annually, as determined by the CLT.146 The ground
lease also prohibits assignment or sublease without the CLT’s written
approval.147 These provisions are intended to ensure that the lesseehomeowner is using the property for its intended purpose, as opposed to
renting it out at market rates that would undermine the CLT’s affordability.148
The ground lease also establishes a base rent for the land, payable
monthly.149 This rental amount covers the cost of CLT operations in
maintaining the land and executing the ground lease, and may be influenced by
state regulations.150 CLTs take great caution to make sure that the ground rent
does not render the home unaffordable.151
The ground lease also includes provisions that establish the CLT’s central
role in the continuity of affordability from one homeowner to the next. The
lease provides that a homeowner must (1) allow the CLT first option to
purchase back the home at the resale-restricted price,152 or (2) sell the home at
the resale restricted price to an “income-qualified” individual.153 The ground
lease further grants the CLT power of attorney to sell the property on behalf of
the owner under certain circumstances.154 With the knowledge that they will
have first option to purchase units back from lessees, CLTs can seek out and
145

Id. § 12, at 3.
Id. For an example of this requirement in practice, see CMTY. HOUS. TRUST OF SARASOTA, supra note
131, art. 4.4 (requiring ten months’ annual occupancy).
147 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 14.
148 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 215.
149 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 4.
150 See John Emmeus Davis et al., Building Better City-CLT Partnerships: A Program Manual for
Municipalities and Community Land Trusts 77 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP08JD1,
2007) (describing a Michigan State Housing Development Authority policy that requires all CLTs that the
Authority funds to contribute at least $25 per month into a Capital Reserve Fund).
151 Id. § 13, at 5–6.
152 Id. § 12, at 12.
153 Transfers to specific heirs, such as children, are also allowed even if they are not income-qualified, but
all other heirs must demonstrate income qualification to possess the premises. Id. § 12, at 11–12.
154 Id. § 12, at 13 (granting power of attorney to the CLT when “[l]essee (a) is not then residing in the
Improvements and (b) continues to hold the Improvements out for sale but is unable to locate a buyer and
execute a binding purchase and sale agreement within one (1) year of the giving of the Intent to Sell
Notice . . . .”).
146
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prepare income-qualified buyers for placement on a waiting list.155 A waiting
list can prevent the CLT from tying up its limited resources in the repurchase
and holding of units. The purchase option also allows the CLT to re-acquire
the property and relegate it to other community needs, such as a common area
or office space.
One of the key features of the ground lease, and the source of much
contention,156 is the resale formula.157 As a lessee, a homeowner promises
that, upon selling her unit, the sale price will be limited according to a given
formula.158 Resale formulas represent a “shared equity” aspect of the CLT
arrangement.159 Shared equity is the process by which a CLT allocates the
value and risk of owning property between itself (and therefore its
beneficiaries) as lessor and the selling owner as lessee.160 The rationale behind
resale formulas mirrors that described by the Dudley Street Neighborhood
Initiative: increased property value arises out of both owner and community
improvement, and should be allocated as such, especially when the
unmitigated sale of the unit would price out existing community members.161
While the specific formula differs from one CLT to another,162 it always places
some limitation on the amount of equity the homeowner may receive,
preserving affordability for future purchasers.163
The resale formula is the fulcrum of the tension between durable
affordability and individual wealth creation and can be calculated in various
ways.164 Generally these formulas fall into four categories: appraisal-based
formulas, indexed formulas, itemized formulas, and mortgage-based
formulas.165 Appraisal-based formulas are the most common166 and are

155 See Davis et al., supra note 150, at 4 (describing one of the tasks of a CLT as making a waiting list of
interested buyers).
156 See infra Part II.
157 Resale formulas are also sometimes referred to as “limited equity formulas” or “appreciation limitation
formulas.” ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 8, at 2.
158 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 13.
159 Another shared equity aspect of CLT homeownership is the split ownership of structure and land
because the increasing value of the land remains in the hands of the CLT as titleholder and lessor. See DAVIS,
supra note 30, at 18–19.
160 Id. at 5.
161 See discussion of Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
162 Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 29−32 (survey of resale formulas among CLTs
nationwide revealed a wide variance in type and amount of resale formula).
163 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 18−19.
164 JACOBUS & LUBELL, supra note 10, at 10−11.
165 Id.
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featured in the Model Ground Lease provided by the Institute for Community
Economics. These formulas compare the owner’s purchase price to an
appraised fair market value of the property. The positive margin between the
two numbers, if there is one, is then divided between the selling homeowner
and the unit itself.167 For example, if the formula allows for a 25% equity
retention by the homeowner the following would apply:
25% Appraisal-Based Resale Formula
Year 1: Homeowner purchases CLT unit—$100,000
Year 3: Homeowner seeks to sell unit—appraised at $140,000
Increase in value: $40,000
Resale Formula: .25(Increased Value) + Year 1 Price = Resale Price
.25($40,000) + $100,000 = $110,000 Resale Price
Homeowner’s positive value margin: $10,000
Amount “retained” in property: $30,000

Indexed formulas fix the rate of increase in the sale price to the rate of
increase of a specified indexed value, such as the area median income (AMI)
or the Consumer Price Index.168 Mortgage-based formulas derive the
maximum sales price by choosing a target level of income, expressed as a
percentage of AMI, and then working backwards from that income level to
derive the maximum affordable price.169 Finally, itemized formulas determine
the sales price by adding or subtracting specific amounts from the original
price, such as the cost of improvements made to the property or an inflation
factor.170 Each CLT must establish its resale formula balanced against the
tension between the affordability goals of the CLT and the needs and
limitations of its community, resulting in the wide spectrum of shared equity
formulas that appear across the country.171 The formula is initially determined

166 In a recently conducted survey by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, fifty-one of ninety-four
responding CLTs indicated that they use an appraisal-based formula. Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra
note 7, at 31–32. Twenty-one responding CLTs use an indexed formula. Id.
167 Id. at 31.
168 Id. at 32.
169 This price is based on an affordability factor of 33% of monthly income including taxes, interest, and
insurance. JACOBUS & SHERRIFF, supra note 68, at 24. Only four CLTs responding to the Lincoln Institute
survey reported that they used mortgage-based formulas. Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 32.
170 Only three CLTs responded to the Lincoln Institute survey indicating that they use this method of
calculation. Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 32.
171 Id. at 30–32 (reporting appraisal-based resale formulas ranging 2%–60% of the equity allocated to the
owner, with a median value of 25%).
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by CLT organizers and members,172 and in the case of revision—which is an
intentionally difficult process173—guided by the board of directors and
approved by the voting membership.174 In the event that a CLT amends the
resale formula, it only applies to existing ground leases if the lessee
specifically agrees to the change.175
3. Commitment to Affordability Established in Subsidy Retention
The CLT model facilitates housing affordability and community
development by getting the most mileage out of housing subsidies. Typically,
when a low-income individual seeks to purchase a home she has two options:
traditional homebuyer assistance provided by state and federal programs like
the Federal Housing Administration, or other subprime loan options available
from private lenders.176 In recent years, lenders have offered “creative”
mortgages and low-to-zero down payments to borrowers whose financial status
and credit scores did not qualify them for traditional mortgage products.177
However, the subprime crisis has underscored the risk—individual and
systemic—involved in the unregulated promotion of these products.178
On the other hand, traditional public homebuyer assistance aims to lower
the cost of home purchases by offering grants or low-interest loans to
individual homebuyers.179 These homebuyer assistance programs focus on
affordable payment for the individual but fail to consider the affordability of
the housing unit itself.180 To develop this distinction more fully: a plan that
only aims to reduce a person’s monthly housing burden181 by providing
subsidies that merely reduce that individual’s payment—such as a down
payment grant or “soft second” mortgage—may not consider whether that
subsidy is actually increasing the supply of affordable housing in the long
172

ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 12, at 23–24.
Id. at 25–26.
174 See discussion of amended resale formulas, supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
175 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 12, at 26.
176 See Alan Mallach, Preface to DAVIS, supra note 30 (describing common strategies for low-income
people to access homeownership). See generally Sean Zielenbach, A Critical Analysis of Low-Income
Homeownership Strategies, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 446 (2004) (discussing
various low-income options for financing the purchase of a home).
177 DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED 69 (2009).
178 See id. at 3.
179 See JACOBUS & LUBELL, supra note 10, at 8.
180 Id. at 9–10.
181 Here, the discussion focuses primarily on homeownership programs to maintain a comparison between
CLT durable affordability and other homebuyer assistance methods.
173
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run.182 The subsidy merely makes an unaffordable property manageable—or
even profitable—for one individual or family.183 Even when these programs
involve some level of subsidy recapture,184 they do not necessarily pace the
rising cost of homes, and end up requiring a greater investment after one lowincome homebuyer cycles through and a new one comes along.185 By focusing
almost entirely on the cost of a home for each individual buyer, traditional
homeownership assistance programs approach affordability as a problem that
is income-generated—the homebuyers do not make enough money to play in
the regular market. The CLT model, however, adds nuance to the inquiry.
While CLT homebuyers qualify based on their income, the model views
“affordability” in terms of whether the price of the house is accessible—not
whether the individual can be hoisted into affordability.186
“Locking in” a subsidy involves keeping the price low and the unit
perpetually available to future income-qualified persons.187 Funds devoted to
the creation of CLT units are retained in the property itself, sustaining their
value through multiple sales.188 For example, the Champlain Housing Trust
(CHT) in Burlington, Vermont, completed a study of all government subsidy
invested in CHT houses that had resold between the years of 1988 and 2008.189
The results of the study showed that CHT was able to use subsidies of 152
homes to help 357 families obtain CLT homeownership.190 The amount that
this cost public coffers was five times less than it would have been if each
subsidized homeowner had pocketed the subsidy upon sale.191 Interestingly,
182

See JACOBUS & LUBELL, supra note 10, at 9–10.
See Mallach, supra note 176 (“[W]here house prices are rapidly appreciating, publicly subsidized
homeownership can lead to windfalls for a few, while other less fortunate lower income households are being
pushed out of their own communities.”).
184 In a subsidy recapture program, the public subsidy must be paid back when the homebuyer resells the
property. JACOBUS & SHERRIFF, supra note 68, at 5–6.
185 Id. at 11–13.
186 See JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS & ALICE STOKES, CHAMPLAIN HOUS. TRUST, LANDS IN TRUST HOMES THAT
LAST: A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE CHAMPLAIN HOUSING TRUST 21–27 (2009), available at
http://www.champlainhousingtrust.org/assets/files/Lands-In-Trust_Homes-That-Last.pdf
(measuring
the
preservation of affordability of Champlain Housing Trust homes by assessing the average resale price of the
home against a household income of 50%–80% area median household income as compared to market rate
Burlington housing).
187 RYAN SHERRIFF & JEFFREY LUBELL, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, WHAT’S IN A NAME? CLARIFYING THE
DIFFERENT FORMS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES OF “SHARED EQUITY” AND “SHARED APPRECIATION”
HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAMS 20 (2009).
188 DAVIS & STOKES, supra note 186, at 27.
189 Id. at 27−30.
190 Id. at 29.
191 Id. at 30.
183
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the study found only two instances where a public subsidy was lost in its
entirety, and both cases involved foreclosure.192 Ninety-six percent of the time
a CLT home changed hands, the home remained affordable enough that the
purchase required zero increase in public investment.193
II. FINANCING CLT HOMEBUYERS
The CLT model shares at least one characteristic with nearly every other
type of homeownership: the need for homebuyer financing. While the CLT
model subsidizes and locks in long-term affordability, buyers generally still
need to borrow money to purchase the home. Often, the very provisions that
make CLT homes affordable complicate the lending relationship, making
homebuyer financing one of the most widespread challenges for CLT
growth.194
Some lenders view the CLT structure as a credit asset because the CLT’s
stewardship goals operate as a backstop in the event of a mortgage default.
These lenders often work with CLTs to establish portfolios of CLT lending.195
Most residential lenders, however, are unfamiliar with the ground lease
structure and do not lend money to purchasers without a fee simple interest in
the land.196 Furthermore, lenders are skeptical of the CLT ground lease
because its terms will encumber the property even in the event of foreclosure.
In an effort to remedy this hesitation, CLT advocates have worked with Fannie
Mae to develop a method by which mortgages to CLT homebuyers could be
mainstreamed.197 However, the fruits of these efforts, while they may
encourage lenders to loan money to CLT homebuyers, jeopardize the fabric of
the CLT model by threatening to strip the ground lease of its affordability
provisions.
After outlining these challenges, this Part argues that the risk of lending to
CLT homebuyers is not as great as is perceived and should not be addressed by
holding hostage the provisions that ensure the long-term affordability of the
CLT model, especially in cases where CLTs have been subsidized with public
resources. Next, solutions are presented which propose stronger support of the

192
193
194
195
196
197

Id. at 29.
Id.
ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 2.
Telephone Interview with Roger Lewis, Exec. Dir., NCLTN (Jan. 22, 2010).
Id.
ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 8.
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CLT model by government and quasi-government entities already charged
with the duty to promote affordable homeownership.
A. The Need for CLT Homebuyer Financing
CLT homeowners are income-qualified individuals198—people who have
typically stood at the margins of the housing market and therefore may be
unfamiliar with lending practices. As is the case with most homebuyers,
income-qualified individuals do not have access to enough cash to complete
their purchases. They must acquire a mortgage. The terms of their mortgage
agreements will structure their payment schedules, directly impacting the
affordability of their purchases and the stability of their tenure. For this
reason, and because some lenders have been known to take advantage of needy
borrowers,199 CLT ground leases generally limit the kind of mortgage product
that a homebuyer may solicit.200 In the wake of the recent housing crisis, this
practice has been extolled as one of the most important elements of CLT
survival and success.201
Specifically, the ground lease stipulates that the CLT must approve any
mortgage before the purchaser may agree to it.202 The CLT agrees to approve
any mortgage that conforms to the Standard Permitted Mortgage (SPM)
qualifications laid out in the ground lease.203 According to the Model Ground
Lease, SPMs may only be granted to institutional lenders or Community
Development Financial Institutions.204 SPMs must also be first liens on the
property,205 and must grant the CLT the right to notice of a default in payment
and the right to cure that default on behalf of the homebuyer.206 Because most

198 This category is typically defined as persons making between 50% and 80% of area median income.
DEP’T. OF URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING, UNIV. OF WISC.—MADISON, A SURVEY OF NATIONWIDE
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST RESALE FORMULAS AND GROUND LEASES 3 (2002), available at http://www.
burlingtonassociates.com/resources/archives/ResaleFormulasandGroundLeases.pdf.
199 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Piling on Borrowers Buried by Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at
BU1.
200 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 7 (discussing a “permitted mortgage”).
201 Fireside, supra note 17 (“Unlike shady mortgage brokers, ‘[CLTs are] not going to let people take
risky mortgage products . . . .’”).
202 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 7.
203 Id.
204 Id. § 12, at 22.
205 Id. In other words, without specific approval of the CLT, CLT homeowners may not seek second
mortgages or otherwise encumber their property title.
206 Id.
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residential mortgages do not contain these provisions,207 the CLT is able to
review the lending documents of its purchasers to screen out possible predatory
lending practices.208 This practice is not only good for the homebuyer, it also
protects the CLT from the instability of having its residents teeter on the edge
of financial ruin. Providing stable, affordable homeownership is, after all, the
primary organizational goal of most CLTs.
B. The Difficulty of Finding a Lender
In contrast to CLTs, which approach homeownership as an avenue for
stable housing, lenders understand homeownership in terms of investment
opportunity. Homebuyers need to borrow money, and lenders provide that
money at interest for the purpose of generating a profit. If the homebuyer does
not or cannot pay the lender back, the lender can resort to foreclosure and
attempt to sell the house (and the lease to the land underneath it) to recover the
amount due.209
Just as CLTs are cautious of some mortgage products, lenders are skeptical
of some aspects of the CLT model. Although ground leases are quite common
in commercial real estate transactions,210 the vast majority of residential
mortgages are initiated on a fee interest in the land—not a leasehold interest.211
Fortunately, some lenders are nonetheless willing to lend to CLT
homebuyers.212 These lenders understand that lending to CLT homebuyers can
be a secure investment because of the role of the CLT as a safety net.213 For
207 Not because the terms are problematic, but because most homebuyers do not have a local community
organization offering to step in to cure financial defaults. The most common security deed language can be
found in each state’s Fannie Mae and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) Standard
form. See Security Instruments, EFANNIEMAE.COM, https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/
secinstruments/index.jsp (providing a list of standard forms for every state).
208 Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 373–74.
209 MARGE MISAK ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. LAND TRUST NETWORK, 2008 FORECLOSURE SURVEY 2 (2009),
available
at
http://www.cltnetwork.org/doc_library/p238-2008%20CLT%20Network%20Foreclosure%
20Survey%20Report%201009%20post.pdf. NCLTN has recently conducted and published a 2010 foreclosure
survey resulting in similar findings. NCLTN worked with Vanderbilt University to produce a final report
comparing the 2009 and 2010 surveys, and discussing the resilience of the CLT market against the prevailing
dismal climate of the greater housing market. EMILY THADEN, NAT’L CMTY. LAND TRUST NETWORK,
OUTPERFORMING THE MARKET: MAKING SENSE OF LOW RATES OF DELINQUENCIES AND FORECLOSURES IN
COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS (2010), available at http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=
Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=2173.
210 Owning a CLT Home, HOMESTEAD COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www.homesteadclt.org/pdf/
OwningaCLThome.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
211 Id.
212 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 1.
213 DAVIS & STOKES, supra note 186, at 6.
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example, lenders are happy to agree to provisions that allow the CLT to cure
mortgagor default.214
Unfortunately, although those lenders who originate mortgages with CLT
purchasers enjoy the security of CLT default protection, they do not find the
ground lease’s affordability provisions as appealing. While the ground lease is
intentionally chosen by the CLT as a durable method of delivering
permanently affordable housing,215 current demands of lenders threaten to
unravel the very provisions that ensure affordability. Because any mortgage
obtained on the CLT property is necessarily subordinate to the ground lease,
the terms of the ground lease continue to operate even after foreclosure.
Lenders dislike provisions in the ground lease that could thwart their ability
to recover their investment through foreclosure.216 In particular, they are wary
of resale-restrictions and income-qualified buyer limitations.217 Incidentally,
these are two of the CLT’s most powerful tools for ensuring the long-term
affordability of the unit.
Lenders view resale restrictions as threats to the value of their security.218
If a buyer defaults in payment and the lender initiates foreclosure, lenders want
to avoid any provisions that might hamper the property from selling for enough
to cover the debt remaining on the mortgage. This is not merely out of concern
for their own solvency, but also is symptomatic of the demands of secondary
mortgage market investors, who prefer assets that can be easily liquidated.219
The CLT ground lease is senior to the loan and therefore survives foreclosure
proceedings, limiting (1) how much the property may sell for220 and (2) to
whom the property may be sold.221 If unmodified, the terms of the ground
lease would apply to any foreclosure sale purchaser.
Because the CLT model requires homebuyer financing, lenders occupy a
position of tremendous bargaining power. Evidence of this bargaining power
214 However, lenders are less likely to agree to provisions requiring them to notify CLTs in the event of
default. ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 4, 8.
215 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 221.
216 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 2.
217 Id. § 20, at 5.
218 Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 378–79.
219 Fannie Mae, for example, reports its assets in terms of the outstanding principal on its mortgages,
indicating the amount that investors should recover either through payments or through foreclosure. See, e.g.,
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 54 (Aug. 6, 2009).
220 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 11.
221 Id.
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can be found in section 8.3 of the Model Ground Lease, entitled “Removal of
Certain Provisions Pursuant to Foreclosure.”222 This section provides that in
the event of foreclosure or assignment of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, sections
10.1–11 “shall be deleted and thereupon shall be of no further force or
effect.”223 The deleted sections of the ground lease stipulate the terms by
which the property may be transferred, including resale price formula, income
qualifications for potential buyers, and the CLT’s right of first refusal—nearly
every provision that ensures long-term affordability of CLT homes. Quite
obviously, a CLT would not choose to strip itself of these provisions
unprompted. In this way, lenders use their superior bargaining power to
compel CLTs to shoulder any risk associated with CLT homebuyer financing.
If the homebuyer does not pay back the loan, the CLT must sacrifice the future
affordability of the unit.
In addition to resale restrictions, prospective mortgagees fear the CLT’s
termination rights under the ground lease.224 Although mortgagees could
easily cure a lapsed ground rent payment, they have no easy way of curing the
nonmonetary defaults of the lessee, such as ones requiring the use of the
premises as a primary residence. Although preferably the CLT would
negotiate with the homeowner to address any violations, the underlying power
of the lease grants the CLT legal right of termination if an agreement cannot be
reached.225 For lenders this power threatens their interest in the property
because termination of the ground lease can result in forfeiture of the unit to
the CLT.226 In this way, lenders and CLTs find themselves in a bind: the CLT
needs to be able to enforce the provisions of its lease, and the lender does not
want the incurable behavior of the lessee to threaten its security.
One solution that has been discussed would be to assign a monetary value
to each nonmonetary default so that the lender could cure it.227 Another
solution is to add a cross-default clause into the terms of the mortgage, which
would equate default under the ground lease with default under the
mortgage.228 These solutions address the related problems of CLT and lender
222

Id. § 12, at 8.
Id.
224 Id. § 12, at 15.
225 Id.
226 See Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 216 (discussing ground lease termination due to default as a total
forfeiture).
227 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 5. Under the terms of most mortgages, when a lender incurs costs
associated with its interest in a property, it is permitted to add this amount to the principal due on the loan.
228 See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
223
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by merging the homebuyer’s duties as lessee with her duties as mortgagor.
However, in doing so, homebuyer default under the ground lease becomes a
liability under the mortgage. Because of the ground lease-stripping provisions
outlined in section 8.3, this liability either forces the CLT to bail out the
borrower—and effectively pay for violations to its own ground lease—or it
edges the homebuyer closer and closer to foreclosure—and the impending loss
of long-term affordability provisions. In other words, these “solutions” force
the CLT to take on any and all risk associated with the homebuyer’s duties
under both the ground lease and the mortgage. Lenders, on the other hand, are
in a position to either collect profit-generating interest from monthly payments
or foreclose on the property and sell it at a price even the homebuyer would not
have been able to realize. In both cases, the lender or the foreclosure sale
purchaser—often one and the same—appropriate public subsidies that would
have otherwise been captured in the CLT model for the purpose of affordable
homeownership.
Despite this apparent double standard, CLTs have
consistently had to sacrifice crucial affordability provisions to ensure
homebuyer financing.229
C. The Fannie Mae Uniform Rider and the Secondary Mortgage Market
Generally, lenders mitigate the financial risk of lending by ensuring that
their loans conform to the standards set by government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) like Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(“Freddie Mac”). Chartered by the federal government, the GSEs purchase
loans from lenders, securitize them, and sell them to investors on the secondary
mortgage market.230 When they use GSE standard forms, lenders make their
loans eligible for purchase should they need or choose to sell them to free up
capital.231
However, CLT homebuyers cannot use the standard mortgage forms
because the terms of conforming mortgages do not account for ground lease
provisions.232 Therefore, lenders cannot be certain that they will be able to sell
the loan in the secondary mortgage market via Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
229

Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 378.
About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last
visited Aug. 16, 2010).
231 FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 21–24 (2009) (describing extra
requirements and warrants that lenders must make to sell nonstandard documents to Fannie Mae), available at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/sg/pdf/sg1209.pdf.
232 See ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 8 (describing the purpose of the Fannie Mae Rider as a
document necessary to provide conformity among CLT loans).
230
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Without the standard forms, the GSEs would need to look at each loan
individually before purchasing it—a time-consuming process that all but
prevents purchase.233 Therefore, instead of mitigating the risk of lending to
CLT homebuyers, GSE standardization creates a disincentive for lenders to
work with CLT buyers.
To alleviate this problem, CLT advocates from the Institute for Community
Economics and NCLTN have worked to negotiate a method for standardizing
CLT mortgages.234 As a result of these negotiations, in 2006 Fannie Mae
announced that it would purchase CLT mortgages from lenders so long as the
parties sign a Uniform Rider that certifies the approved uniformity of CLT
mortgages.235 Essentially, the Rider bypasses the individual review process
Fannie Mae would otherwise require,236 mitigating the risk of lending to a CLT
homebuyer with increased liquidity in the secondary market.
While the existence of the Rider may facilitate CLT homebuyer lending by
mitigating the risk to lenders, the language of the Rider perpetuates the
sacrifice of affordability provisions that has plagued the CLT lending process
from the start.237 The Fannie Mae Rider institutionalizes the principle that if
CLT homebuyers need to borrow money, then the CLT must shoulder the risk
of borrower default by placing the ground lease—and long-term future
affordability—on the chopping block.
Fannie Mae’s Rider amends the ground lease for the period of time during
which the mortgage remains outstanding.238 The Rider institutionalizes many
of the provisions that individual lenders imposed upon CLTs.239 It also
provides for ground lease enforcement by instituting a cross-default clause
between the mortgage and the ground lease, as discussed earlier.240

233

Id.
Id.
235 FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 06-03, PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO RESALE RESTRICTIONS OR LOCATED
ON LAND OWNED BY COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS 10 (2006), available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/
guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2006/06-03.pdf.
236 Id.
237 See FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 4.
238 Id. at 1.
239 See discussion of lender-imposed changes to the ground lease supra notes 218–29 and accompanying
text.
240 FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 5 (“A default by the Lessee under the Lease shall constitute a default
under the Specified Mortgage.”).
234
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However, what Fannie Mae gives in enforcement rights, it takes away in
the event of foreclosure. In the event that the Mortgagee acquires title to the
property through foreclosure or assignment in lieu of foreclosure, the Rider
states that:
[A]ll provisions of the [Ground] Lease regarding (a) occupancy of the
Leased Premises as a primary residence by the Lessee, (b) any
limitation on the assignment of, or sublease under, the Lease, (c) any
obligation to target certain populations in marketing the leasehold
estate to potential transferees, (d) the price at which the leasehold
estate may be transferred, and (e) the income of successive
transferees, and their successors and assigns, shall be of no further
force or effect with respect to such Specified Mortgagee or its
241
successive transferees, assignees or successors.

This single provision strips five sections from the Model Ground Lease, each
of which contains an important element of the CLT affordability model.242
In exchange for the power to strip the ground lease of every provision that
ensures continuous affordability, the Rider offers the CLT one major benefit:
the option to redeem the home after foreclosure by purchasing it for the cost of
the outstanding debt.243 However, this option is contingent upon the lender
acquiring the property via foreclosure sale or assignment in lieu of
foreclosure.244 If someone else purchases the property at foreclosure or if the
CLT does not have the financial stability to purchase the property within the
allotted time period, “the leasehold estate may be transferred, mortgaged and
sublet an unlimited number of times, and the Lessor shall not require a credit
review or impose other qualifying criteria on any such transferee, mortgagee or
sublessee.”245

241

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Upon foreclosure, the Rider strips the following provisions from the ground lease: Article 4, section 1
(Residential Purposes) and possibly section 4 (Occupancy); Article 11 (Assignment and Sublease); and the
following provisions of Article 10: 10.2 (Transfer to Income-Qualified Person), 10.6 (Lessor’s Purchase
Option), and 10.10 (Resale Restriction). In addition to these modifications, the Model Ground Lease, which
Fannie Mae requires as a prerequisite to using its Rider, provides for the removal of Article 10 “Transfer Sale
or Disposition of Improvements” entirely. ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 8.
243 FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 3 (“Should the Lessor not choose to cure an Event of Default as
specified above, the Lessor shall nevertheless have the option to purchase the leasehold estate from the
Specified Mortgagee for [debt owed to Specified Mortgagee] as of the date of closing of the purchase . . . .”).
244 Id.
245 Id.
242
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Although the Fannie Mae Rider might increase availability of credit for
CLT purchasers,246 it has not mitigated many of the most crippling
compromises that lenders impose on the CLT model. By requiring the Rider,
Fannie Mae is able to orchestrate changes in the ground lease that would
otherwise take tremendous political will if attempted within the governing
framework of the CLT.247 Outside of Fannie Mae’s Rider, other important
government entities such as Freddie Mac or Rural Development do not have
any uniform policy regarding CLTs.248 Furthermore, CLT homebuyers
generally cannot access FHA-insured mortgages because FHA regulations are
either incompatible with or have been interpreted to conflict with some CLT
affordability mechanisms.249
D. Against the Sacrifice of Ground Lease Affordability
Federal and state housing and development programs serve as major
funding sources for CLTs.250 The high rate of subsidy-recapture inherent in
the CLT model251 can be a selling point for public funding. When a CLT unit
is sold in foreclosure and all affordability provisions are stripped from the
ground lease, it can be bought and sold by anyone at any price. The
enterprising new homeowner—who has no formal commitment to the CLT and
its affordability goals—effectively captures all previous federal, state,
municipal, or community investment in the unit. With the help of the Fannie
Mae Rider, the foreclosure sale transforms a CLT unit from a bulwark of
affordability into a publicly subsidized investment opportunity.252
The affordability-stripping provisions outlined in the Rider impact the
growth of the CLT movement nationwide.253 The CLT startup process
246 In actuality, the vast majority of CLT lenders have kept CLT mortgages in their portfolios instead of
passing them downstream to Fannie Mae. Telephone Interview with Roger Lewis, supra note 195.
247 Bylaws typically require a supermajority to amend the ground lease. See supra notes 99–102.
248 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 10, at 4.
249 CLT Homeowners Access to FHA Insured Mortgages, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK,
http://www.cltnetwork.org/doc_library/CLT%20Homeowners%20Access%20to%20FHA%20Insured%20Mor
tgages%20051809.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
250 See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 64 (discussing CLTs as developers and as property managers).
251 See discussion of public subsidy retention through the CLT model supra notes 182−93 and
accompanying text.
252 The CLT Legal Manual offers a rosy spin to the “enterprising new homeowner” scenario by explaining
that the ground lease provides for an increase in ground lease fees when the property is released from resale
restrictions: “In situations where land values are high and the amount of the lease fee has previously been
subsidized, the increase in revenue for the CLT can be substantial.” ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 2, at 5.
253 Although the number of operating CLTs has increased significantly over the past decade, many CLTs
remain inactive. Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 7−11.
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requires the proper alignment of community initiative, local support, financial
backing, and resource availability.254 In order to protect its stewardship
interest in its property, a CLT must maintain constant access to the financial
resources necessary to redeem a unit from foreclosure.255 This is especially
arduous for startup CLTs, which generally operate for three years before they
can survive off of ground lease fees.256
Lending interests, including GSEs like Fannie Mae, should not be so
reticent in their approach to CLT lending: a CLT is a nonprofit community
corporation that operates to ensure the long-term affordability of housing. By
the time it is negotiating for financing on behalf of a buyer or discussing
uniform riders with Fannie Mae, its intentions and operations have long been
vetted by the government.257 It may even have developed strong working
relationships with a local municipality.258 Many CLTs have not only been
granted tax-exempt status, but they have been dubbed CHDOs simply for
being organized as a CLT, and are thus automatically eligible for federal
funding under that title.259 The CLT is a mainstreamed entity acknowledged
for its successful model,260 and yet it must compromise that model to negotiate
financing for homebuyers, for fear that the collateral is not adequately
standardized or substantially liquid.
Meanwhile, the secondary mortgage market, including the GSEs, spent the
last decade purchasing subprime loans from independent, unregulated lenders
under terms that were all but certain to drive mortgagors into default.261
Interestingly, the financial and social profiles of CLT buyers are not
resoundingly different than those of their subprime mortgagor counterparts.

254

See DAVIS, supra note 50, at forward.
If the property goes into foreclosure and the CLT is unable to purchase it, the foreclosure sale
purchaser is under no obligation to comply with any of the affordability requirements outlined in the ground
lease. However, the CLT is required to maintain a lessee–lessor relationship with the new homeowner.
256 CLT experts recommend that start-up CLTs secure three years of operational funding before they
launch. DAVIS, supra note 50, at 59.
257 See, e.g., ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 6, at 1 (discussing the vetting process for tax-exempt status,
and other benefits that follow).
258 For a discussion of municipal involvement in CLTs, see Milne, supra note 22 (discussing the benefits
and drawbacks of Limited Equity Cooperative and CLT cooperation with municipal governments).
259 See discussion of CLT per se CDHO status supra note 83 and accompanying text.
260 Fireside, supra note 17 (discussing the Champlain Housing Trust’s recent international recognition for
its affordable housing work).
261 David S. Hilzenrath, Fannie’s Perilous Pursuit of Subprime Loans, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2008, at
D01.
255

STEIN GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

10/5/2010 12:02 PM

WAKE UP FANNIE

245

Indeed, a prospective CLT buyer and a target subprime borrower generally fall
within the same margin of the area median household income.262
However, one major difference exists between subprime and CLT
borrowers: a recent survey of CLT foreclosure statistics revealed that even in
the midst of the current foreclosure crisis, CLT mortgages were six times less
likely to be in foreclosure than any other mortgage—prime or subprime—
nationally.263 Similarly, the likelihood of default was far lower for loans
secured by CLT properties.264 On December 31, 2008, only 1.4% of reported
CLT mortgages were 90+ days delinquent, as compared to 3.74% of all prime
loans, and 23.11% of all subprime loans, nationally.265 This statistical data
reveals a tremendous gap between the perceived and actual risk of lending to
CLT homebuyers. These statistics also indicate that the CLT, which relies on
conventional mortgage products, is a safe and effective way to encourage lowincome homeownership, and beckons greater institutional support—
government and otherwise.
E. Eliminating Affordability-Stripping from the Fannie Mae Rider
The CLT model offers sustainable affordability to low-income
homebuyers, supports opportunities for below-market rental units,266 and
simultaneously presents lenders with a relatively secure investment, as it has
thrived during a period of record-high mortgage foreclosures.267 This
resilience results from a series of organizational commitments and legal
structures that define the CLT model—each of which is threatened by current
lending practices. While the Fannie Mae Rider standardizes CLT loans for
sale on the secondary market, in doing so it institutionalizes the stripping of
ground lease provisions that ensure long-term affordability and leaves public
investment open to the possibility of private capture.
This section argues that Fannie Mae should amend its Rider language to
further the financing of CLT homes without undermining the long-term
262

Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 386.
MISAK ET AL., supra note 209, at 3–4.
264 Id. at 3.
265 Id.
266 See supra text accompanying note 17.
267 Aaron Miripol, Colorado: Invest Wisely to Fix Real Estate Crisis, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 11,
2008,
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/aug/11/colorado-invest-wisely-fix-real-estate-crisis;
Van Temple, What Foreclosure Crisis? Community Land Trusts Offer Secure Homeownership, ROOFLINES
(July 10, 2008), http://www.rooflines.org/1026/what_foreclosure_crisis_community_land_trusts_offer_
secure_homeownership.
263
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viability of the model. Fannie Mae has “an affirmative obligation to facilitate
the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income
families . . . .”268 It is supposed to fulfill this obligation “in a manner
consistent with [its] overall public purposes, while maintaining a strong
financial condition and a reasonable economic return . . . .”269 This language
speaks to the important public purposes GSEs are intended to carry out.
Unfortunately, literature produced by the CLT movement assumes the
rather defeatist position that ground lease affordability stripping is a
concession CLTs must make to provide affordable homeownership.270 From
the CLT’s current bargaining position, this may be so, especially after CLT
advocates spent years negotiating with Fannie Mae to produce the current
Rider. However, Fannie Mae already provides for the survival of resale
restrictions for non-CLT properties—even ones that operate through ground
leases.271 Fannie Mae, in its unique position as a GSE, can mitigate risk for
lenders while simultaneously supporting the CLT commitment to long-term
affordable homeownership. To this end, this section proposes amendments to
the Fannie Mae Rider that would allow resale restrictions and other
affordability provisions to survive foreclosure and simultaneously buffer
lenders’ risk.
Removing affordability-stripping provisions from the Rider will not
significantly increase the risk of lending to CLT homebuyers because they
carry a disproportionally low repayment risk.272 Rider language that strips
affordability provisions from the ground lease does so to increase the
likelihood that the property will recover debt in foreclosure.273 But CLT
mortgages are less likely to end up in foreclosure than their conventional
counterparts.274 While individual lenders may choose to ignore this fact,
Fannie Mae has a duty to facilitate lending for affordable housing.275
268 12 U.S.C. § 4501(7) (2006) (charging the GSEs with an affirmative obligation to further affordable
homeownership).
269 Id.
270 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 5 (“CLTs, though they would prefer to see these restrictions
retained, have generally recognized the need to accommodate mortgage lenders on this point.”).
271 When the resale restrictions survive foreclosure, the lender must “represent[] and warrant[] that the
resale restrictions do not impair the servicer’s ability to foreclose on the restricted property.” FANNIE MAE,
supra note 132, at 4.
272 For example, CLT homebuyers have lower default rates than other borrowers on a nationwide basis.
See MISAK ET AL., supra note 209.
273 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 5.
274 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
275 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (2006).
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The Rider seems to have been crafted by simply replicating the
affordability-stripping practices of profit-driven lending institutions, which
have no chartered duty to promote affordable housing. In doing so, Fannie
Mae falls short of its public duty as a GSE. In fact, the Rider language has a
more detrimental effect on the CLT model than any individual lender’s
decision to strip affordability provisions because it institutionalizes and
nationalizes that practice. Now, if a CLT were to convince a lender to finance
homebuyers without modifying the ground lease, that lender would be unable
to sell the loan to Fannie Mae.276
While affordability stripping overstates the risks of ground lease resale
restrictions, there are other risks of securing a mortgage with a leasehold estate
that should be attended to. Lenders justifiably fear termination of the ground
lease, which, if unaddressed in the loan document, could result in forfeiture of
the mortgage security.277 For this reason, it is appropriate to maintain Rider
language that equates a default under the ground lease with a default on the
mortgage. With the removal of provisions that strip the ground lease of its
signature affordability mechanisms, the cross-default clause benefits both the
CLT and the lender by holding the borrower-lessee accountable without
sacrificing the long-term affordability of the unit.
Assuming that the actual risk of lending to CLT homebuyers is much lower
than the perceived risk,278 state actors can easily change the landscape of CLT
homebuyer financing by underwriting that risk without assuming tremendous
liability. Because many of the policies that control lending availability are
discretionary, the changes proposed require surprisingly little political will.279
The impact that GSE policy could have on CLT homeowner financing
probably encouraged CLT advocates to approach Fannie Mae for a uniform
policy to begin with. However, it is now time to revisit the assumptions
underlying Fannie Mae’s decision. Amending the Rider language as
276

FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 10.
Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.
278 Again, this is indicated by the foreclosure statistics presented earlier, see supra text accompanying
notes 263–65, as well as the fact that current methods for calculating financial risk have developed in an
ownership paradigm that does not account for the CLT model, which prizes stewardship of affordable
homeownership and land tenure.
279 Amending the Fannie Mae Rider is only one of many ways that federal policy could encourage
financing that complements CLT long-term affordability goals. Another proposed solution involves amending
FHA regulations to ensure that CLT homebuyers are eligible for FHA homeowner insurance. See NAT’L
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, supra note 249 (suggesting material changes to FHA regulations
governing the eligibility of nonprofit affordable housing programs). FHA regulations generally also guide
access to state FHA assistance, another counterintuitive source of resistance to CLT homebuyer support. Id.
277
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recommended should continue to mitigate lender risk by maintaining CLT loan
access to the secondary mortgage market and by protecting lenders from total
loss of security. These proposed amendments use Fannie Mae’s involvement
in the secondary mortgage market to bolster and support CLT homebuyer
financing for low-income individuals, echoing the congressional findings that
established Fannie Mae’s operational objectives.280
CONCLUSION
This Comment discussed the CLT model for creating and preserving
affordable homeownership as it developed over the past four decades and as it
operates currently. The CLT model, although not the only viable model for
affordable homeownership, operates innovatively within current legal
structures to establish and enforce long-term affordable housing. The model
presents an efficient, resilient project for public investment.
This Comment addressed the importance of mortgage financing to the CLT
model of homeownership and described some of the challenges that CLT
homebuyers face in securing loans. So far, measures intended to increase CLT
homebuyer credit access have required that CLTs concede to the stripping of
long-term affordability provisions from their ground leases in the event of
foreclosure. Most notably, Fannie Mae—a GSE with the duty to support
affordable homeownership—implemented such affordability-stripping
practices in its required Uniform Rider.
This Comment suggests that federal and state entities ought to begin
affirmatively supporting the CLT model. Specifically, it argues that Fannie
Mae should amend its Rider to demonstrate confidence in the CLT model’s
ability to offer affordable, sustainable homeownership to low-income
individuals. These amendments are not drastic changes, and they do not betray
Fannie Mae’s corporate goals. They also do not solve all of the problems that
the CLT model faces.281 The amendments would, however, mark a change of
course for the lending industry—a timely adjustment, in light of the most
recent economic crisis.282

280

See discussion of Fannie Mae’s affirmative obligation to further affordable housing supra note 271 and
accompanying text.
281 These changes do not address difficulties CLTs face when funding property acquisition or housing
development, for example. Nor do they address challenges that may arise out of state law, which governs
contract and property claims.
282 For more on Fannie Mae’s role in the subprime mortgage crisis, see IMMERGLUCK, supra note 176.
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Over the past four decades, a litany of federal regulations and programs
have aimed to expand credit to underserved communities in an effort to
increase homeownership across racial and class lines.283 Concurrent with these
developments, CLTs fashioned a complementary strategy: a model for
lowering the cost of homeownership entirely, reducing the amount of money
homebuyers need to borrow. These two approaches, far from incompatible,
nonetheless find themselves at an impasse.
In addition to the federal policies that incentivize low-income lending, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development requires that a certain
percentage of Fannie Mae’s loan purchases consist of mortgages to lowincome individuals. These kinds of policies ought to have mitigated the
standoff between lenders and CLTs.284 Instead, these policies resulted in
Fannie Mae expanding its investment in high-risk mortgage products,285 while
simultaneously stripping affordability provisions out of CLT ground leases in
the name of risk mitigation. Ironically, today Fannie Mae rests in federal
conservatorship, “unable to fulfill [its] mission of providing liquidity, stability,
and affordability to the housing market[,]”286 while CLT borrowers enjoy the
security of having default and foreclosure rates significantly below national
averages. Surely, the time for revision is upon us.
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Id. at 164.
For example, HUD sets affordable housing goals for the GSEs, requiring a certain percentage of their
loan purchases consist of mortgages to low-income individuals. 12 U.S.C. § 4561 (2006); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 1282.12, 1282.14 (2010).
285 IMMERGLUCK, supra note 177, at 4.
286 Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Recent Regulatory Responses: Hearing Before the S.
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